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Taxable Income Management by Nonprofit Organizations
Abstract: Nonprofit organizations are subject to an unrelated business income tax on the portion of their activities that is not related to their primary exempt purpose. Taxable activities are nonprofits' fastest growing revenue source although, on average, nonprofits report significant losses on these taxable operations. Prior research finds that these losses are largely caused by joint cost allocations from tax-exempt to taxable activities. We use these joint cost allocations as a measure of nonprofit tax reporting aggressiveness and find that these allocations are increasing in marginal tax rates, the use of paid preparers, financial need, and complementarities, and decreasing in audit risk and reputation. These findings have implications for the efficiency and equity of the tax on nonprofits' unrelated activities and suggest that, despite having differing overall objective functions, nonprofits respond to tax incentives in ways similar to for-profit corporations and individual taxpayers.
INTRODUCTION

This paper investigates taxable income management by nonprofit organizations.
Although most net income earned by nonprofit organizations is free of income tax, profits from activities that are unrelated to their primary exempt purpose are subject to federal and state unrelated business income taxes (UBIT). Common sources of unrelated income include advertising in exempt organization periodicals and commercial pharmacy sales by nonprofit hospitals. Congressional records suggest two purposes for the tax: first, to prevent unfair competition with taxable businesses arising from nonprofits' tax-exempt status; and second, to raise revenue (U.S. House 1950) . Although the UBIT is the smallest of the four income tax systems in the United States, it is the most quickly growing (Meckstroth and Arnsberger 1998) . 1 An extensive literature examines individual and corporate taxable income management (see Andreoni et al. 1998 for an excellent review).
2 The primary motivation for these studies is that cross-sectional variation in taxable income management affect the efficiency and equity of the tax system. The purpose of this paper is to conduct an analysis of the characteristics associated with taxable income management by nonprofit organizations. In addition to the traditional motivation (i.e., efficiency and equity consequences), two additional features make the nonprofit tax setting particularly interesting for study. First, taxable activities themselves represent a somewhat contrary operation within a nonprofit. It is not clear how a nonprofit, ostensibly driven by charitable purposes rather than earning and accumulating profits, will respond to various incentives inherent in operating an ancillary commercial venture that on average is but a small part of its total operations. Second, on average nonprofits' taxable activities appear to be highly unprofitable. The average nonprofit reports losses in excess of 30 percent of taxable activity revenues, a situation that has persisted for at least 10 years and is unique among income taxes in the United States (U.S. Department of The Treasury 2000).
These losses contrast with nonprofits' overall operations, which have earned an average profit of over 10 percent of revenues during the same period. For many nonprofits it is unlikely that any unrelated business taxes will be paid in the near future as the average nonprofit has accumulated over $250 thousand in net operating losses, which are available to offset future tax liabilities should any be eventually reported. Prior research shows that one cause of these reported losses is that nonprofits allocate joint costs from their tax-exempt to their taxable activities (Sansing 1998 , Cordes and Weisbrod 1998 , Yetman 2001 ).
We use the estimated joint cost allocations found in prior research as our measure of taxable income reporting aggressiveness (i.e., our dependent variable) for two reasons. First, joint cost allocations are a significant tax minimizing activity for nonprofits. Yetman (2001) finds that his estimates of nonprofits' joint cost allocations are of a sufficient magnitude that they can largely explain the reported average unprofitability of nonprofits' taxable activities. Second, in the nonprofit setting, more traditional taxable income management measures, such as those from the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program, are not constructed by the IRS and are therefore unavailable for assessing nonprofit aggressiveness in reporting taxable income.
We include two sets of independent variables that may affect nonprofits' propensities to aggressively allocate costs to their taxable activities. Our first set includes measures of marginal tax rates, IRS audit risk, and paid preparer status. These variables are suggested by analytical treatments of taxpayer behavior (Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Srinivasan 1973 ) and were studies is that there is variation among taxpayers with respect to the amount of taxable income they choose to report to a taxing authority, and that specific taxpayer characteristics may be associated with this variation.
included in prior research on individual and corporate taxable income management. It is not clear ex-ante that nonprofit managers will respond to these factors in the same way that either individuals or managers of for-profit corporations do. On the one hand, the primary purpose of nonprofits' taxable activities is to generate additional profits, which ostensibly can be used to further the charitable mission. In this case, nonprofit managers may always seek to minimize their tax liabilities to the greatest extent possible. On the other hand, taxable activities may be perceived as too small (less than three percent of total revenues on average) to attract managerial attention. It is also possible that nonprofit managers may be inherently different than managers of for-profit corporations in terms of their perceptions and attitudes towards compliance with regulatory schemes, and therefore may make different tax reporting decisions.
Our second set of independent variables is somewhat unique to the nonprofit setting and includes measures of reputation, financial need, and the ability to exploit production complementarities. We include a reputation measure because taxable activities are ancillary and nonprofits may be less willing to increase their after-tax profits by aggressive joint cost allocations if they fear that discovery of the tax minimizing allocations will result in damage to their reputation. We include a measure of financial need because prior research finds that one reason nonprofits engage in taxable activities is to overcome pressing financial needs (Hines 1998) . If true, it is also possible that financial need would affect a nonprofit's willingness to aggressively allocate joint costs to its taxable activities. Finally, we include a measure of the extent to which a nonprofit can utilize common production complementarities (i.e., the use of existing facilities, production inputs, or knowledge base) between its primary mission-related activities and taxable commercial ventures because the presence of complementarities can make it easier to generously allocate joint costs to taxable activities (Sansing 1998 (Sansing 1998 ).
In the next section, we provide a brief background on nonprofit taxation and relevant tax compliance research. Following sections discuss our data, our empirical analysis, and the results of our tests. The final section concludes.
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR LITERATURE
Nonprofit taxation
The UBIT was enacted in 1950 after Congress determined that nonprofits' tax-exemption should not apply to activities that would otherwise unfairly compete with fully taxable for-profit entities (U.S. House 1950) . The taxable portion of nonprofits' commercial activities is growing at almost 30 percent per year (Asinoff 2001). The IRS, the U.S. Small Business Administration, and industry trade groups are concerned that the rapid expansion of nonprofits' taxable and nontaxable commercial activities represents a potentially significant source of unfair competition (Ramsey 1986; Gomes and Owens 1988; Berss 1994; Brady 2000; Manzullo 2001) . In response to these concerns Congress is considering expanding the scope of the UBIT to include a much broader range of commercial activities (U.S. Small Business Administration 1984; Orban 1999).
If however, nonprofits are able to effectively reduce their taxable income through joint cost allocations, then efforts to increase the number of activities or the net revenues subject to the UBIT are unlikely to reduce the effects of unfair competition or to result in expected increases in tax revenues. Andreoni et al. (1998) provide an excellent and thorough review of the extensive theoretical, empirical, and experimental literature on individual taxpayer aggressiveness. The seminal theoretical model, which still forms the basis of most modern compliance models, was derived by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973) . These models measure the effects of tax rates, detection probabilities, and penalty levels on the utility gained by underreporting taxable income. Generally, the models predict that aggressive reporting behavior is decreasing in audit and detection probabilities and penalties. Results with respect to tax rates vary across modeling assumptions about taxpayer risk aversion with respect to wealth utility.
Determinants of aggressive tax reporting behavior literature
Subsequent analytical models introduced the interaction of the taxpayer and tax return preparer and generally find that individual taxpayers seek out tax preparers to resolve complex tax issues and that the use of paid tax preparers increases compliance (Klepper, Mazur, and Nagin 1991; Phillips and Sansing 1998) . Experimental evidence examining the relationship between paid tax preparers and tax reporting is generally consistent with the analytical predictions and suggests that taxpayers do not demand risky or aggressive tax advice (Hite and McGill 1992) . However, archival empirical evidence finds that individual income tax return preparers are associated with more aggressive tax advice (Erard 1993 ).
By comparison, few studies have examined the factors associated with corporate income tax reporting behavior. Rice (1992) constructs and tests the first model of corporate tax behavior and finds no relationship between using a paid preparer and corporate tax compliance, although many of the other factors that affect individual tax compliance also affect corporate tax compliance including audit risk and tax rates.
To date, no study has examined the factors associated with nonprofit taxable income management. The few existing nonprofit tax studies consider cost allocation or income measurement issues. Sansing (1998) was the first to analytically examine nonprofit cost allocation incentives and demonstrates that, when nonprofits' taxable and tax-exempt activities are linked via common costs, nonprofits will shift more expenses from their tax-exempt to their taxable activities. Cordes and Weisbrod (1998) and Yetman (2001) find that nonprofits allocate joint costs from their tax-exempt to their taxable activities to reduce their tax liabilities.
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
To estimate the effects of organization-specific characteristics on a nonprofit's propensity to allocate joint costs to its taxable activities, we estimate the following model:
Joint Costs = a + ß 1 MTR + ß 2 Audit Risk + ß 3 Preparer + ß 4 Complement + ß 5 Need + ß 6 Reputation + ß 7 Assets + ß 8 Assets 2 + ß 9 Medical + ß 10 Educational + µ. (1) The variable Joint Costs is the estimated amount of joint costs that a nonprofit reallocates from its tax-exempt to its taxable activities. The estimates for Joint Costs are from Yetman (2001), who uses various models to partition expenses between taxable and tax-exempt activities. The modeling process involves regressing total expenses on taxable revenues and tax-exempt revenues, and then multiplying the regression coefficient estimates by total expenses to derive estimates of taxable and tax-exempt variable expenses. The first step partitions variable expenses between taxable and tax-exempt activities, leaving fixed expenses unallocated.
Because IRS regulations permit nonprofits to allocate both common variable and fixed expenses to their taxable activities, the modeling procedure allocates all remaining expenses (ostensibly fixed expenses) to taxable and tax-exempt activities based on average revenues. The difference between the amount of estimated taxable expenses using this estimation process and those reported on the nonprofits' tax returns are an estimate of joint cost allocations. 3 It is important to note that these joint cost allocations are estimates based on plausible economic models and cannot be interpreted as non-compliance. Furthermore, the estimates likely contain measurement error. To the extent that the measurement error is not systematically correlated with our covariates, the related coefficient estimates will be unbiased.
Our measure of the marginal tax rate is the nonprofit's federal marginal tax rate on its taxable net income (net of net operating losses) after adding back the joint cost allocations. For example, if a nonprofit reported taxable profits of $1,000 on its IRS form 990-T and the joint cost allocation estimate from Yetman (2001) was $500 (suggesting that the nonprofit allocated $500 of expenses from its tax-exempt to its taxable activity), we add back the $500 to the $1,000
to arrive at a "pre-managed" taxable income figure of $1,500. We then use the marginal tax rate from the IRS form 990-T tax tables on $1,500 of taxable income (the tax rate structure is the same as for corporations) as our measure of the pre-allocation marginal tax rate. 4 If a nonprofit has a net operating loss sufficient to offset its taxable income, we set the marginal tax rate equal to zero. Prior theoretical research suggests that aggressive tax reporting behavior is increasing or decreasing in tax rates (depending on assumptions about risk aversion), while empirical research generally finds that aggressive reporting behavior is increasing in tax rates.
Our measure of nonprofit-specific audit risk is the ratio of taxable revenues to total revenues. Congress does not prevent nonprofits from earning unrelated taxable revenues;
although it will revoke a nonprofit's tax-exempt status if the ratio of taxable revenues to total revenues becomes excessively large. 5 Because taxable revenues were used in the joint cost allocation estimation procedure, there may be an endogenous relationship between these two measures. Because of this, we used two-stage least-squares where the value of audit risk is the fitted value from a first stage regression of audit risk on various exogenous variables. 6 Our two-stage least-squares results were not qualitatively different (and inferences unchanged) from those reported in the paper which use ordinary least-squares.
Our tax return preparer variable is equal to a one if the tax return was prepared by a paid preparer, and zero otherwise. In all cases where a paid preparer was used, the preparer was a certified public accountant (CPA). As previously discussed, prior analytical and experimental research suggests that the use of a paid tax preparer is associated with less aggressively prepared tax returns. Empirical evidence on individual income tax returns finds the opposite result, while empirical research on corporate income tax returns finds no association.
Our measure of a nonprofit's ability to exploit production complementarities is an indicator variable equal to one if the nonprofit's taxable and tax-exempt activities could reasonably use similar production inputs or know-how, and zero otherwise. For example, consider a hospital that earns taxable medical laboratory revenues such as outsourcing laboratory tests for private (non-hospital affiliated) physicians. It is reasonable to assume that this hospital also uses its laboratory to produce tax-exempt revenues (i.e., lab services for currently admitted patients), and therefore could use its existing facilities and know-how to generate taxable revenues. On the other hand, consider a hospital that owns a for-profit subsidiary and receives taxable passive investment income from the subsidiary. In that circumstance, it would be less likely that the hospital could exploit production complementarities. We generated this variable based on descriptions from the nonprofit's tax returns (IRS form 990-T, line H) where the nonprofit provides a brief description of its taxable activity. 7 Because nonprofits often engage in several taxable activities at once, yet only describe their major taxable activity on line H, this variable likely contains measurement error, which will have the effect of biasing the related coefficient estimate towards zero. Sansing (1998) analytically shows that a nonprofit's ability to allocate joint costs from its tax-exempt to its taxable activities is a function of the degree of production complementarities between the taxable and tax-exempt production functions.
Our measure of financial need is the nonprofit's total liabilities. All else equal, nonprofits with higher liabilities (either conditional on assets or scaled by assets) have greater financial need. Hines (1998) shows that one reason nonprofits engage in taxable activities is to overcome financial need, which likely increases the possibility that financial need also influences joint cost allocation decisions. Inferences with respect to financial need are qualitatively robust to using the ratio of current liabilities to current assets, current liabilities to total assets, and by using similar measures but excluding any income tax liabilities.
Our measure of a nonprofits' public reputation is the total donations received. Prior research finds that nonprofits with higher reputations attract more donations (Okten and Weisbrod 2000) . Although size could be an additional reputation measure, we avoid interpreting our size variable and include it mainly as a control.
DATA
The database is a pooled, cross-sectional hand collected sample of 1,824 matched sets of forms 990 (publicly available information return) and 990-T (not publicly available income tax return "Rental Activity"). 8 The signature portion of a tax return kept in client files is often blank because the file copy is made before the signature block is filled out. Rather than assume who the tax preparer was, we excluded these observations.
RESULTS
Univariate Results
Summary statistics for the analysis variables are reported in Table 1 Because the preparer identified sample (i.e., 1,367 observations) is smaller than the full sample (i.e., 1,824 observations), we tested to see whether the smaller subset is significantly different across our analysis variables. Untabulated results show that the only significant difference between the full and reduced samples is the level of donations with the reduced sample receiving significantly fewer donations when compared to the full sample (p<.000). The remaining variables are not significantly different between the full and reduced sample. 10 Appendix A discusses the downward (conservative) modeling biases in this measure. Because any bias in the reallocation estimate is consistently applied to each organization in the sample, it should not introduce estimation bias in a cross-sectional regression. In other words, although bias causes the allocation estimate for any single nonprofit to be different from its true value, comparisons across two nonprofits (i.e., in a regression analysis) should remain unaffected. 11 Estimation error in the dependent variable will not bias coefficient estimates unless the error is correlated with an included independent variable. Because our results are unchanged by using several alternative formations of the dependent variable using the Yetman (2001) These correlations are not surprising given that each is highly correlated with organization size.
In a univariate sense, joint cost allocations are increasing in marginal tax rates, the use of a paid preparer, complementary activities, reputation, and assets. Joint cost allocations are decreasing in audit risk and financial need.
Regression Results
We present results for four variations of model (1). All models include (untabulated) yearly fixed effects as well as industry effects (i.e., medical, educational, or charitable nonprofit).
In the first model, we include raw (unscaled) variables. 12 The first two model variants use unscaled continuous variables with and without asset controls. Our third and fourth models scale all continuous variables (i.e., Joint Costs, Need, and Reputation) by total assets or total revenues. 13 To control for the possible effects of extreme Joint Costs values we conducted 12 In all models, we control for outliers by excluding observations with a Cook's D statistic greater than 1.0, although few observations fell into this category and results were not changed by including them. We present results without excluding any observations due to this control. 13 In addition to these models, we also used logged values for all continuous variables (alternatively using the negative log of absolute values for negative allocations). Alternative definitions of the dependent variable included the ratio of joint cost allocations to total reported taxable expenses and the ratio of reported to estimated tax expenses (i.e., tax expenses as reported on the tax return / tax expenses as reported on the tax return + estimated joint cost allocations). Results with respect to these alternatives were qualitatively similar to the unscaled model presented in the paper.
specification tests using windsorized values of Joint Cost at the 99 th and 95 th percentiles. Our inferences are qualitatively robust to these specifications. Audit Risk across all model specifications. From a policy perspective, these findings are important in that they suggest nonprofits are sensitive to tax rate and audit risk which are considered to be Congresses' primary tools for tax compliance manipulation. The extent to which nonprofits respond to these traditional policy tools provides information useful to policymakers concerned with UBIT's equity and efficiency.
Joint cost allocations are increasing in the use of paid preparers (Preparer), although this result is not robust to the model which scales all continuous variables by total assets. In terms of magnitude, our results suggest that the use of a paid preparer is associated with an additional $100,000 (approximately) in joint cost allocations. Because we do not interpret our dependent variable as illegal tax evasion, we cannot conclude that CPAs are associated with tax evasion.
Our results do suggest that CPAs are particularly adept at minimizing their clients' tax liabilities via joint cost allocations. This finding has implications for UBIT's equity and efficiency because it suggests that taxpayers hiring CPAs pay fewer taxes, introducing cross-sectional variation in taxes paid (i.e., inequities) as well as causing tax planning expenses to be incurred (i.e., inefficiencies via dead weight costs). Although analytical and experimental results find that using paid preparers will result in less aggressively prepared tax returns, empirical evidence in this and other studies suggests the opposite. Results with respect to Marginal Tax Rate, Audit
Risk, and Preparer are generally consistent with findings in the individual and corporate taxpayer behavior studies. Given that nonprofits are inherently different from for-profit firms and individuals (nonprofits seek to maximize a benevolent output rather than wealth utility) it is interesting to find that they respond to these incentives in similar ways.
The remaining explanatory variables are, to some extent, particular to nonprofit organizations. The ability to exploit production complementarities (Complementary) is associated with an additional $100,000 (approximately) of joint cost allocations, although this result is not robust to either of the models which scale the continuous variables. Financial need (Need) is positively associated with joint cost allocations. In terms of magnitude, an additional $1,000 of liabilities is associated with an additional dollar of joint cost allocations. This finding suggests that nonprofits are more willing to make large joint cost allocations when facing financial needs. Joint cost allocations are decreasing in Reputation. Results suggest that an additional $1,000 of donations is associated with a decrease of $3 in joint cost allocations.
Because we control for both financial need and organization size, we interpret this finding as suggesting that nonprofits with higher reputations make fewer joint cost allocations. Finally, joint cost allocations are increasing in Assets and decreasing in Assets 2 . The finding that reputation and audit risk costs (and to a lesser extent strong financial position) are deterrents to joint cost allocations is important because it helps to explain why there is variation in joint cost allocations and in particular why some nonprofits appear to not allocate joint costs from taxexempt to taxable activities.
As an additional robustness test we replicated our analysis using joint cost allocations generated by an alternative expectations model with no change in the study's inferences. In the alternative model, expected taxable expenses were equal to: Tax  Revenues  Taxable . The difference between expected taxable expenses as generated by this alternative model and the amount of taxable expenses as reported on the nonprofit's form 990-T is the alternative estimated joint cost allocation. This model assumes that taxable activities consume expenses in the same proportion as tax-exempt activities.
14 From a tax policy perspective, these results suggest that Congressional efforts to increase the amount of taxable revenues reported by nonprofits will not necessarily result in increases in tax receipts or decreases in unfair competition. To the extent that nonprofits are able to deftly reduce (and in many cases completely avoid) tax liabilities via joint cost allocations, any plausible amount of taxable revenues can be effectively managed. If policymakers are intent on increasing UBIT receipts and decreasing the potential for unfair competition, our results suggest that a necessary first step would be to address how joint costs are allocated.
14 Several variations of the alternative model were used, some of which excluded donations and investment revenues from tax exempt revenues (because they are not "business" revenues), as well as excluding grants paid and fundraising expenses from tax exempt expenses (because they are not "business" expenses). In no case were the empirical inferences of the study altered, although the mean (and median) values of the estimated joint cost allocations were smaller than those found by Yetman (2001) .
CONCLUSIONS
Nonprofits are subject to an unrelated business income tax on net profits from activities not closely related to their tax-exempt purpose. The simultaneous operation of differentially taxed activities provides nonprofits with an incentive to shift joint costs from taxable to taxexempt activities to minimize overall tax liabilities. We use estimates of these joint cost allocations to determine which organization specific characteristics are associated with taxable income management in the nonprofit setting.
Results find that joint cost allocations are increasing in marginal tax rates, the use of paid preparers, financial need, and complementarities, although the results for complementarities and paid preparer status are not robust across all model specifications. Joint cost allocations are decreasing in audit risk and reputation. These results are similar to those found in the individual and corporate income tax behavior literature suggesting that, although nonprofits are inherently different in terms of objective functions, they respond to incentives to manage their taxable income in similar ways. Our results add to the growing body of research that attempts to understand the effect of the unrelated business income tax on nonprofits' behavior. Our results suggest that recent efforts by Congress to increase the amount of taxable revenues reported by nonprofits will not necessarily result in increased tax receipts nor decreases in unfair competition as nonprofits appear particularly adept at allocating joint costs to reduce or even eliminate their tax liabilities.
Given that the taxable activity of nonprofits is quickly expanding and the deterrent effect of the unrelated business income tax is little understood, we hope our study encourages additional analyses. 
APPENDIX A
Yetman (2001) derives estimates of nonprofits' tax-motivated expense allocations from tax-exempt to taxable activities using a two-step procedure. In the first step, he uses a firstdifference regression of total expenses on taxable revenues, tax-exempt revenues, and investment revenues to partition variable expenses:
∆Total expenses i = α + β 1 ∆Taxable revenues i + β 2 ∆Exempt revenues i + β 3 ∆Investment revenues i + ε i .
The product of β 1 and the organization-specific amount of taxable revenues is his estimate of variable expenses incurred to generate one dollar of taxable revenues. The same procedure is used to arrive at estimated variable expenses for tax-exempt and investing activities.
In the second step of the modeling process, the difference between total expenses and the sum of the variable expense components (i.e., organization-specific estimates of variable expenses for taxable, tax-exempt, and investing activities) is his estimate of fixed costs. He partitions these fixed costs between taxable and tax-exempt activities using average revenues.
He does not allocate any fixed expenses to investing activities. The sum of allocated taxable variable expenses from the first step, plus the allocated taxable fixed expenses from the second step, becomes his estimate of total taxable expenses. He then compares this estimate of taxable expenses to those reported by the nonprofits on their respective IRS form 990-Ts with differences representing positive or negative expense allocations.
This procedure assumes that: (1) expenses are proportional to revenues, (2) the relationship between revenues and expenses is constant within nonprofit types (i.e., medical, educational, and charitable), and (3) variable expenses are incurred on a marginal basis and fixed expenses are incurred on an average revenue basis. The modeling procedure ignores (i.e., holds constant) the possibility that nonprofits can shift revenues across tax-exempt and taxable activities.
The modeling procedure introduces some conservative mechanical biases. First, by excluding investment revenues from fixed cost allocations, the procedure assumes that the nonprofit incurs no fixed expenses to generate investment revenues. To the extent that a nonprofit does incur this type of fixed expenses, estimated taxable fixed expenses are too large.
Overestimating the amount of estimated taxable expenses downward biases the measure of taxmotivated expense allocations. Second, the sample's taxable activities are more profitable than the population's. If the profitability difference between the sample and the related population is due to differences in expense allocation aggressiveness, the estimates of joint cost allocations are biased downward. Finally, fixed costs are allocated on an average revenue basis, which likely allocates a disproportionate amount of fixed costs to taxable activities because taxable activities are likely to be more economically profitable (i.e., incur fewer costs per dollar of revenue generated) for two reasons. First, taxable activities may be more profitable because of their role in a nonprofit's mission: to generate additional funds to support the nonprofit's tax-exempt functions. This would lead nonprofits to maximize taxable revenues and minimize taxable expenses. At the same time, nonprofits aim to maximize expenditures on their exempt missions.
These two forces would tend to drive up the profitability of nonprofits' taxable activities relative to their tax-exempt activities. Second, unrelated business revenues can cause the loss of taxexempt status and evoke a negative public reaction; nonprofits are likely to require a higher rate of return for taxable activities than for tax-exempt activities. Preparer is an indicator variable equal to one if the nonprofit used a certified public accountant to complete its Form 990T, and zero otherwise. Complementary is an indicator variable equal to one if the taxable activity can exploit production complementarities, and zero otherwise. Need is the total liabilities of the nonprofit. Reputation is the total donations to the nonprofit organization. Assets is the total assets of the nonprofit. ** = Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * = Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Yetman (2001) . Marginal Tax Rate is the estimated last-dollar marginal tax rate. Audit Risk is the ratio of total taxable revenues divided by total taxable and tax-exempt revenues. Preparer is an indicator variable equal to one if the nonprofit used a certified public accountant to complete its Form 990T, and zero otherwise. Complementary is an indicator variable equal to one if the taxable activity can exploit production complementarities, and zero otherwise. Need is the total liabilities of the nonprofit. Reputation is the total donations to the nonprofit organization. Assets is the total assets of the nonprofit. Medical and Educational are indicator variables equal to one if the organization is a hospital or school, and zero otherwise. Yearly fixed effects are included, but not tabulated. Corrected t-statistics are in parentheses and significance is based on one-tailed p-values. * (**) denotes significant at the 0.01 (0.05) level.
